

ADM. ANNEX
Security (Rewrite)
CBH

In intelligence, security is the "sea around us", the atmosphere or habitat in which intelligence must live. Thus while security can be both burdensome and bothersome, it is also critically essential -- so essential that one cannot assay the effectiveness of CIA without assaying its security system.

And yet because security is enforced through restraints and controls, it hobbles the operation of an intelligence system just as it safeguards the end results. As a result the exercise of security in intelligence is partly an exercise in balance. How can the agency attain maximum effectiveness without relaxing its security restrictions? And how can the agency achieve maximum security without handcuffing itself in excessive restraints?

The dilemma is not easily resolved. Few agencies are more vulnerable than CIA to the damage that can be done by deliberate or by careless disclosure. For not only could penetration of CIA reveal U. S. practices in intelligence but it might also enable the Soviet to repair its own security system while mapping a more effective pattern of deception.

Part 2, Section 7

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
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SECURITY INFORMATION

While security is in part an administrative problem, it is also a problem of people. For while investigations and guard systems, protective devices and document controls provide safeguards against security lapses, the ultimate problem in security is one of discretion among the agency's employees. Talkative employees are only scarcely less dangerous than disloyal ones. Thus a leakproof security system is dependent upon the leakproof security habits of agency personnel. But these habits must be inculcated and developed through indoctrination and security training. And as is so frequently the case with most good habits, security mindedness comes only with time.

During the agency's current busy period of personnel build-up, this task of security training has swollen in size. And while there have been few evidences of laxness in security procedures, there have been evidences of strain within the security system. However, once the agency is stabilized and the press to expand is eased, security practices within CIA may be expected to surpass even their present high-quality standards.

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


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Part 2, Section 7

setting up cover and this experience is already reflected in the use of sounder, more effective techniques.

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But this does not mean the agency is not troubled by soft spots. Indeed the primary weakness in CIA's security system results from a condition that can be remedied only by Congress. Within the metropolitan area of Washington alone, the agency currently occupies a total of [redacted] separate structures, an increase of [redacted] in the last fifteen months. This dispersal constitutes an acute security hazard on which the Congress has already been briefed. The movement of persons, documents, equipment, and waste paper from building to building in this vulnerable complex exposes the agency to the daily danger of deliberate penetration.

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One year ago CIA asked the Bureau of the Budget to find it secure quarters under a single safe roof. When the Bureau reported that no satisfactory structure could be found, it supported the agency in a request to Congress for new construction. But although the 82nd Congress authorized \$38,000,000 for construction, the necessary appropriations legislation failed in the House. A tentative site has been selected in downtown Washington for a CIA headquarters?

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building and working drawings have been prepared by PEA. Just as soon as Congress reconvenes, CIA will resubmit its request for funds for this single safe structure.

Comprising as it does a wide variety of activities, some of which are admissible, many of which are not, CIA exists as an enigmatic agency both in official Washington and in the minds of the public. While it can without fear of compromise admit to its role as coordinator of the U. S. national intelligence, CIA must remain muzzled on its espionage activity and on its "cold war" department of dirty tricks. Yet contrariwise the public ascribes to CIA the role of U. S. "master spy" in almost total ignorance of its admissible coordinating functions. Consequently CIA is advertised almost exclusively as the U. S. "secret service".

This identity has left CIA with two alternative courses. Either it can ignore this popular tendency to dramatize it as the U. S. "cloak and dagger" center. Or it can seek to counteract this tendency by diverting emphasis from the covert to the overt side of its organization.

The latter alternative was the one favored in recommendations of the Dulles Report. Consequently in an effort to dim the lurid aura that provokes interest in its secret activities, CIA has sought to project itself to the public as an ordinary agency of government engaged in coordination of the U. S. national intelligence system.

And although the original objective was a negative one, the agency has realized collateral benefits from this policy of diversion. For in admitting to its role in the intelligence system, CIA has helped reassure the public that policy is compounded on intelligence assembled from all sources in an orderly pattern.

*Should not
overlook the
fact of a
public NSC policy
directive
now in
effect on
this
subject?*

Nevertheless there are those who still contend that overt activities are inseparable from acutely sensitive covert ones, that any information (whatever the intent) is potentially damaging to CIA. This traditional attitude probably permeates the intelligence community at large. It is apparent, therefore, that if CIA is to screen its covert activities by the overt, departmental intelligence agencies will have to be educated to the desirability of the technique.

Security is always a relative condition; it is never so good that it might not be better. Thus while CIA is neither apprehensive nor alarmed over the state of its security discipline, the agency is not satisfied that the security habits of its employees cannot be vastly improved.

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Growth and expansion from October 1950 to the present have created a major problem in the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency security program. Assuming the utmost in thoroughness in investigation of applicants, the best investigative aids, a perfection in guard systems, in protective devices, and in controls, (real security is no better than the leadership exercised by supervisors and the personal security assumed by each individual employee.) When an agency has been stabilized with only a small turnover of personnel, and when it has had a chance to catch its breath, personal security is easier to achieve. In the period October 1950 to 31 December 1951, this has not been possible, and though there has been no evidence of any laxness in administrative arrangements for security, there have been evidences of strain.

During the period, sound security policy was not used in a number of operational projects and certain errors and compromises resulted. Indoctrination of employees upon their initial contact with the Agency requires improvement, and initial briefing of light official cover personnel needs a general tightening up. However, no major penetrations of the Agency have been discovered;--rather a number of possible penetrations have been found in advance by counter-intelligence research. The Agency has not had one case of an alleged subversive brought before Congress, before the public by allegations in the press, or reported by the FBI.

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In spite of apparent success in its major mission, there are a number of circumstances and policies which, as of 31 December 1951, still detract from the general security of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In the Washington area the Agency occupies [REDACTED]

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25X9A2 an increase of [REDACTED] since October 1950. This large number of buildings, many widely separated and all readily identified as belonging to the Central Intelligence Agency, creates a definite security hazard. The transportation and courier systems necessary to maintain such a widespread installation are not only costly but also create many risks in the transit of documents, in the collection of classified waste paper, and in inter-office visits by personnel. Efforts to correct this situation--made continuously by requests to Congress for a single building--must be continued.

The Central Intelligence Agency combines in a single organization a wide variety of activities, many of which have different standards of security. The fact that some Agency activities exist, for example, is a matter of public record; the knowledge of others is highly secret. The security of covert activities, therefore, risks being compromised by the lower standards of security of the overt. Any knowledge whatsoever of the Central Intelligence Agency is, in fact, a tool in the hands of foreign intelligence analysts. Throughout the

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brand by the public to advertise existence of the Central Intelligence Agency and particularly its "cloak and dagger" aspects. The natural human dramatization of espionage and of secret operations has tended to highlight this, and there have been newspaper and magazine articles about the organization and its work. Where appropriate the Central Intelligence Agency has emphasized its duties as the coordinator of intelligence other than its secret operations in order to cover the special activities entrusted to it. However, on any such occasion the general security of the Agency, of necessity, loses ground, and thereby become new tools for foreign intelligence agents to use.

Serious thinking must continue to be given on a policy level as to how best to achieve the security that the Agency must have vis-a-vis the nation's press, public opinion, and democratic process based on the freedom of information. There must be a determination of the extent to which the role of the Central Intelligence Agency as the centralized coordinator of intelligence should be publicly advertised—consideration given to disadvantages of disclosing anything ~~in~~ advantages of using overt activities to cover secret operations. Steps should be taken to improve the Agency's security by strengthening organizational discipline—an accomplishment which is particularly difficult in a period of expansion of physical facilities, of activities, and of personnel.

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In the period from October 1950 to the present it has been possible to maintain a sound security program with probably the highest standards in Government. However, known weaknesses exist and in order to continue its effectiveness, security must be continuously examined from within and from without.

* * *

Among Central Intelligence Agency support activities is that of procuring, storing, and distributing all supplies and equipment for both overt and covert operations. In the 15 months from October 1950 to the present this has become increasingly a matter of filling material requirements for the Office of Policy Coordination, whose budget has expanded from [REDACTED] for the fiscal year 1950 to a prospective [REDACTED] for the fiscal year 1953. The period itself has been one of growing shortages of critical materials. ^{With} accurate forecasts by the Office of Policy Coordination of the amount of such critical materials have been difficult and at times impossible. This problem has been compounded by the fact that much of the material procurement for the Office of Policy Coordination is in support of such highly sensitive activities that a complex arrangement--which at times must indicate no Government interest whatsoever--is demanded.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Report #2

7/25/52

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of the
REPORT TO THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
for the
SURVEY OF THE
INSPECTION AND SECURITY OFFICE

CIA

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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GENERAL APPRAISAL

The present security posture of CIA, with the exception of a limited number of weak spots, which are pointed up in the enclosed report, compares favorably with that of most sensitive agencies of the Government. These weak spots, the more important of which are highlighted later in this general appraisal, should be remedied; but, in addition, the Agency should continue its efforts to achieve a pre-eminent security position in view of the criticality of its mission and its extreme importance to the national security of the United States.

In virtually all respects, the Office of Inspection and Security is operated efficiently and effectively, due to the competent and expert direction afforded it by its Chief, and to the careful personnel selection practices employed in staffing its various components.

Generally speaking, the responsibilities and functions delegated to IIS are in keeping with good security practices, as are the policies and procedures established and implemented within IIS.

To the extent that such could be determined by limiting this survey strictly to IIS, the general security policies and practices of CIA as a whole - with the exception of a few rather serious deficiencies - appear to be reasonably adequate. This general conclusion takes into account important practical factors which have confronted the Agency in the past, including the extraordinary, but necessarily, rapid growth of the Agency, its highly dispersed physical condition, its lack of an adequate inspectional system, and the characteristic problems which are normally encountered by the security arm of any agency faced with pressing operational and personnel requirements. Insofar as these factors are overcome or minimized the security of CIA will be enhanced accordingly.

The vast majority of the recommendations contained in the enclosed report call for the continuance of the present policies, practices and procedures to which they are addressed. Such recommendations are not singled out in this general appraisal, since they do not necessitate any change in CIA's existing security system. It is emphasized nonetheless that continued adherence to them is essential to the over-all security of the Agency.

The major remaining recommendations, which, if adopted, would necessitate changes in the present security system of the Agency, are listed hereinafter.